CHAPTER I

ΠΝΕЎΜΑ, ΨΥΧΗ, AND ΣΑΡΞ IN GREEK WRITERS FROM HOMER TO ARISTOTELE

The three Greek words that stand at the head of this chapter have all had a long history. The earliest instance of πνεύμα in extant Greek literature is in Aeschylus, of the fifth century B.C., but Diogenes Laertius ascribes it, apparently as a term in familiar use, to Xenophanes of the sixth century. Ψυχή and σάρξ occur in the earliest Greek writers whose writings we possess. All three are still in use today. In the period covered by this chapter—to anticipate the presentation of evidence in detail by a broad statement which will find its support in that evidence—πνεύμα and σάρξ are terms of substance; ψυχή, prevailingly at least, a functional term. Πνεύμα denotes the most intangible of substances—wind, breath, air. Σάρξ stands at the opposite extreme of tangibility, denoting the flesh (or body) of an animal, usually of man. In contrast with both, ψυχή, whatever substantial or physical sense it may once have had, in prevalent usage finds its definition in its functions, denoting that element of a living being, usually man, by virtue of which he lives, feels, acts. In the language of Aristotle (p. 43) "the soul is that by which primarily we live and have sensation and understanding." When the ψυχή is said to be πνεύμα, this signifies, not that the terms are synonyms, but that that which functions psychically is composed of the substance πνεύμα.

I. ΠΝΕЎΜΑ

Πνεύμα does not occur in Homer, Hesiod, or Pindar, but first appears in Aeschylus. Its meanings are:

1. Wind, whether a gentle breeze or blast. This is decidedly the most frequent use, being found in Aeschylus, Sophocles, Euripides, Aristophanes, Herodotus, Thucydides, Demosthenes, Plato, Aristotle, and is apparently the only usage, so far as occurrences of the word have been noticed, in Herodotus and Aristophanes.

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Eurip. Suppl. 962: δυσαίων δ’ ὁ βίος, | πλαγκτα δ’ ὡσει τις νεφέλα | πνευμάτων ὑπὸ δυσχίμων ἄτσσω.

Miserable my life; like a cloud hard driven, I am driven by fearful winds.

Herod. 7. 16. 1: κατὰ περ τὴν χρησιμωτάτην ἀνθρώπουι θάλασσαν πνεύματα φασὶ ἀνέμων ἐμπίπτοντα, οὐ περιορᾶν φύσι τῇ ἕων ἔστρωθα.

Just as blasts of wind falling upon the sea which is most useful to men, they say prevent it from acting according to its own nature (cf. also Aesch. Prom. 1086; Eurip. Her. Fur. 102).

Plato Phaedr. 229B: ἔκει σκόν τ’ ἐστὶν καὶ πνεῦμα μέτριον.

There is shade and a gentle breeze.

Aristot. ii. 940b. 7: ἐστι γὰρ πνεῦμα ἀέρος κίνησις.

For wind is the motion of air (cf. i. 387a. 29).

Metaphorically for a force powerfully affecting the mind, in—

Aesch. Prom. 884: ἓξω δὲ δρόμου φέρομαι λόγος | πνεύματι μάργφα, γλώσσῃ ἄκρατης.

And I am driven out of my course by a furious wind of madness, with no control of my tongue.

Aesch. Suppl. 30: δέξασθ’ ἱκέτην | τὸν θηλυκοῦν στόλον αἰδοίῳ | πνεύματι χόρας.

Receive this suppliant female train with a merciful spirit (?) of the country.


For fortune changed by your tardy change of temper might perhaps come with fresher [or gentler] breeze; but now it is still raging (lit. boiling).


Faith dies, distrust springs up, and the wind is never the same between friends or between city and city.

Tempted by the later use of πνεῦμα in the sense of spirit and by the use of the English word "spirit" in the sense of disposition, one might be disposed to find in these passages some such meaning for πνεῦμα. It should be observed, however, respecting Aesch. Suppl.
30, that the words are an apostrophe to the city, land, and water, the heavenly gods, and Jove, and that they are followed by an appeal to these same powers to send the "male-abounding insolent swarm" into the deep with their swift ships and there meet them with a furious whirlwind. The expression αἰδοῖς πνεύματι χώρας probably means, therefore, either literally or figuratively, a favorable breeze from the land. Similarly in Theb. 708 the author has in mind the figure of a gentle or favoring breeze, and in Soph. Oed. Col. he is describing the change that comes over everything by saying that the wind never blows twice the same way. These instances suffice to show that as early as Aeschylus πνεῦμα, meaning wind, was used in figurative expressions referring to disposition, relationship, or destiny, but not that the word itself had acquired such a secondary meaning.

See other examples of πνεῦμα meaning wind in Aesch. Prom. 1047; Suppl. 165, 175; Pers. 110; Soph. Aj. 558, 674; Trach. 146; Philoct. 639, 643, 1093; Elect. 564; Eurip. Helen. 406, 1663; Suppl. 554; Her. Fur. 216; Cycl. 278; Ion' 1507; Thucyd. 2. 77. 1, 16; 2. 84. 28, 32 (ἀνεμος in immediate context is used in the same sense; cf. πνεύματα ἄνεμον above in Herod., Aesch., and Eurip.); 2. 97. 13; 3. 49. 35; 4. 26. 7; 4. 30. 28; Aristoph. Eq. 441; Pax 175; Ran. 1003; Nub. 164; Xen. Hellen. 6. 2. 27; Anab. 4. 5. 4 (following ἄνεμοι in the same sense); 6. 1. 14; 6. 2. 1; Cyne. 8. 1. 4; Dem. 48. 24; 49. 8; 94. 5; 328. 10; Plato Phaedr. 255C; Cratyl. 410B, C.; Phaedo 77E; Theaet. 152B; Tim. 43C; Legg. 747D; 797E; Pol. 394D; 405D; 488D; 496D. Aristot. i. 146b. 29, 35; 360b. 27; 361b. 13 passim; 394b. 10; ii. 932b. 29, 30, 32, et freq. 1

2. Air, or vaporous substance, tenuity rather than motion being the chief characteristic thought of.

According to Aristot. (Phys. ix. 6, cited by Ritter and Preller, Hist. Phil. Graec., ed. ix. 75a) i. 213b. 22, the Pythagoreans

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1 The notation of all references to Greek authors in this chapter is that of the editions listed in Liddell and Scott, except that references to Aristotle are to volumes, pages, columns, and lines of the Editio Borussica, Berlin, 1831; these are also indicated in the translation of Smith and Ross, Oxford, 1908-, and in the editions of the πνεῦμα by E. Wallace, Cambridge, 1882, and R. D. Hicks, Cambridge, 1902. The lists make no claim to be complete; especially is no attempt made to give exhaustive lists for Plato and Aristotle.
applied the name πνεῦμα to that which surrounds the heavens and from which the heavens derive their space, κενὸν.


In Plato Tim. 49C πνεῦμα apparently means vapor; water is said by condensation to become earth and stone, and these latter in turn by melting and dissolution to become πνεῦμα καὶ ἄηρ, the air (ἄηρ) again becoming, by being heated, fire. Aristotle uses πνεῦμα in a similar sense, also associating it with ἄηρ, in i. 387a, 24–30, but seems clearly to regard motion as the distinguishing quality of πνεῦμα. Distinguishing things that can be volatilized from those which can be vaporized, he says, ἐστὶ γὰρ ἄτμις ἡ ὑπὸ θερμοῦ καυστικοῦ εἰς ἄερα καὶ πνεῦμα ἐκκρίσις εἷς ὕγρῳ διαντική, but a little lower down, ἐστὶ δὲ πνεῦμα κάτις συνεχῆς ἐπὶ μηκὸς ἄερος. Cf. also i. 341b. 22 f. ἐστὶ γὰρ ἡ φλόξ πνεύματος ἐν τὸν ἥσος.

3. Breath of a living being, man or lower animal. This usage occurs in Aeschylus, Euripides, Thucydides, Xenophon, Demosthenes, Plato, and Aristotle.

Aesch. Eumen. 568: κήρυσσε, κήρυξ, καὶ στρατῷ κατείργαθον, | ἢ τ' οὖν διάτορος Τυρσηνική | σάλπιγξ βροτεῖον πνεῦματος πλησισμένη | ὑπέρτονον γῇρυμα φαινέτω στρατῷ.

Proclaim, O herald, and call the people to order, and let the piercing Tuscan trumpet, filled with mortal breath, pour forth its thrilling voice to the multitude.

Plato, Tim. 78A, B: σιτία μὲν καὶ ποτὰ δότων εἰς αὐτὴν ἐμπέσῃ στέγες, πνεῦμα δὲ καὶ πῦρ συμκρομέρεστερα δύτα τῆς αὐτῆς συντάσσεσω σοῦ δύναται. τοῦτος οὖν κατεχρήσατο δ θεός εἰς τὴν ἐκ τῆς κοιλίας ἐπὶ τὰς φλέβας ὀρέλαιαν, πλέγμα εὗ ἄερος καὶ πυρὸς οἰον οἱ κύρτοι συνυφηνάμενος.

When food and drink are put into it (the belly) it holds them, but air and fire being of finer particles than its own substance it cannot hold. These elements accordingly God used for sending moisture from the belly into the veins, weaving a basket-like network of air and fire.

The πνεῦμα καὶ πῦρ of the first part of the passage is evidently synonymous with the ἄηρ καὶ πῦρ of the latter part. But in the first instance πνεῦμα is definitely thought of as taken into the body
by respiration, in the second instance ἀρπ denotes the substance itself. Consistently with this distinction ἀρπ is constantly used in the ensuing context, which describes the construction of the body, but in 79B, when the subject of respiration is taken up for discussion, the use of πνεῦμα is resumed and maintained, till in 79D reference is again made to the network above mentioned, when ἀρπ is again used.

Aristot. i. 473a. 3, 4: ἀλλὰ μὴν οὐδὲ τροφῆς γε χάριν ὑποληπτέον γίνεσθαι τὴν ἀναπνοὴν, ὥσ τρεφομένου τῷ πνεύματι τοῦ ἐντὸς πυρὸς.

But it must not be supposed that respiration is for the purpose of nourishment, as if the inner fire were fed by the breath.

In Eurip. Troad. 758, πνεῦμα, meaning breath, seems to be used figuratively for odor. In Eurip. Hipp. 1391, θεῖον ὀδύν πνεῦμα signifies the odorous breath of the goddess. In Eurip. Phoen. 787, the breath breathed through a tube is called λωτοῦ πνεῦματα. Similarly in Eurip. Bacch. 128, Φρυγίων αἰλῶν πνεῦματι, and in Elect. 749. In Soph. Fr. 13, ἀνθρωπός ἔστι πνεῦμα καὶ σκιὰ μόνον, the word πνεῦμα clearly means air or breath as unsubstantial and perishable.

Other examples of πνεῦμα meaning breath are found in Aesch. Thesb. 464; Eumen. 137; Eurip. Iph. in Taur. 1317; Hec. 567; Or. 277; Phoen. 851; Med. 1075, 1119; Hipp. 1391; Thucyd. 2. 49. 23; Xen. Cyne. 7, 3; Dem. 60. 24; Plato Tim. 79B, 91C; Phileb. 47A; Legg. 865B; Aristot. i. 471a. 27; 472a. 35; 587a. 4, 5; 631a. 27; 660a. 13; 718a. 3.

Closely associated with the idea of breath, perhaps not in reality distinguished from it, is the idea of air as capable of being breathed in or out.

Eurip. Hel. 867: ὡς πνεῦμα καθαρὸν οὐρανοῦ δεξόμεθα.

That we may receive the pure air (breath?) of heaven.

Cf. Plato Tim. 66E; Phaedo 70A.

* ὃ θεῖον ὀδύν πνεῦμα· καὶ γὰρ ἐν κακοῖς ἄν ἐσθήσῃσι σοι κάνειν πλήρεισθην δῆμα· ἐκτὸς ἐν τῷ πιοτῇ ποιεῖσθή "Ἀρεμίς θεά.

"O heavenly whiff of perfume. I am aware thou comest to bring me solace. For thou lightenest my pains. My patroness, the goddess Artemis, is here."
Similarly, denoting air as necessary to life (yet not precisely the breath of life) the word occurs in

Plato *Tim.* 77A: τὴν δὲ ζωὴν ἐν πυρὶ καὶ πνεῦματι συνεβαίνειν ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἐχειν αὐτῷ (i.e., τῷ θυμῷ ζῷῳ).

And it is characteristic of the mortal animal that its life depends on (consists in?) fire and air. Cf. also Aristot. i. 394b. 10ff.

In Plato *Tim.* 84D, E, *πνεῦμα* seems to denote air in various parts of the body, being furnished to these parts by the lungs, which are designated as ὁ τῶν πνευμάτων τῷ σώματι ταμίας.

4. In a comparatively few passages, yet these scattered over a considerable period of time, *πνεῦμα* has a distinctly vital sense, signifying breath of life (loss of which is death), or life, or even more generally the primeval principle or basis of life. In the latter case we may perhaps translate it by the English word "spirit," though it must be remembered that the Greek word remains unchanged and that this change of translation may exaggerate the change of thought in Greek. The transition of usage from the non-vital to the vital sense is perhaps illustrated by a passage in Aeschylus in which the expression *πνεῦμα βίου* occurs.


And they fell upon one another, and happy he who most quickly broke off the thread (lit. breath) of life.

But in the same period we find *πνεῦμα* without *βίου*, having the same meaning.


But after having been saved he lost his life.


Tell me, old man, whether by hand raised to stone or by sword I must die (lit. break off breath). See also Eurip. *Troiad.* 756, 785; *Hec.* 571.

Of peculiar interest are two fragments from Epicharmus, a contemporary of Sophocles, or, as is more probably the case, one passage diversely quoted:
126: Συνεκρίθη καὶ διεκρίθη κάπηλθεν ὥθεν ἦλθεν πάλιν, | γὰ μὲν
εἰς γᾶν, πνεῦμα δ’ ἁνω—τί τῶνδε χαλεπῶν; οὐδὲ ἐν.

Joined it was, is now dissevered and is gone again whence it came; earth
to earth, and spirit above. What difficulty does this occasion? Surely none.¹
(Ahrrens, De Dialecto Dorica, II, 457; Diels, Fragmenta der Vorsokratiker,
I, 122, quoted from Plutarch Cons. ad Apoll. 15.)

146: Εὐσεβῆς νῦν πεφυκὼς ὅν πάθοις κ’ οὐδὲν κακὸν | καθανὼν
ἀνω ὁ πνεῦμα διαμενεὶ κατ’ οὐρανόν. (Ahrrens, op. cit., p. 460; Diels,
op. cit., p. 124, quoted from Clemens Alexandrinus Str., iv, 170.

If with pious mind thou shouldst live, thou wouldst suffer no ill at death.
Above the spirit will continue to exist in heaven.

In view of these quotations from Epicharmus, the former of which is probably nearer to the original than the latter (cf. p. 77),
it is not strange to read the following in Euripides:

Suppl. 531-36: έσαι’ ἡδ’ γῆ καλυφθήναι νεκρός. | δ’ εκασ-
tον ἐσ τ’ σῶμ’ [Mss L and P read φῶς] ἄφικην, | ενταθα ἀπῆλθε,
pνεύμα μὲν πρὸς αὐθέρα, | τ’ σῶμα δ’ ἐς γῆν’ οὕτω γὰρ κεκτήμεθα | ἡμέτερον
αὐτό, πλὴν ἐνοικήσας βλέ, | κάπετα τ’ ἔρεμασαν αὐτό δει λαβέω.

Suffer now the dead to be hidden in the earth, and whence each part
came into the body [or, into the light] thither it departs, spirit to air,
and the body into the earth. For we do not at all possess it as our own, except to live
in for a lifetime, and then the earth that nourished it must receive it.

But Stobaeus (Ecl. IV, 55. 3) ascribes these lines to Moschion, a
writer of the second century A.D., and modern editors such as
Kirchhoff and Nauck (cited by Paley with apparent approval) so
far agree at least as not to ascribe them to Euripides.²

If we may trust the testimony of Diogenes Laertius, writing
in the second or third century A.D., concerning the views of a
philosopher of the sixth century B.C., a century before Sophocles

¹ Cf. Eccles. 12:7: "The dust shall return to earth as it was, and the spirit shall
return to God who gave it." Cf. also Job 34:14; Gen. 2:7.

² In the traditional text of Phocylides, lines 106-8 (Bergk, Poetae lyrici Graecae,
II, 450 ff.), occur the following sentences, πνεῦμα γάρ ἐστι θεόν χρήσιν θηρίων
καὶ εἴκων—σῶμα γάρ ἐκ γαλη ἔχουσι κάπετα πρὸς α’ γῆν λυθειν κόνις εἰμέν, ἄρ’ δ’
ἄνα πνεῦμα δέδεκται, which, with their most interesting context, would be of capital
importance for our purpose, if they were really from Phocylides (sixth century B.C.).
But the poem is now universally admitted to be a forgery and is assigned by Bernays
(see Christ, Gesch. der gr. Liz., 4th ed., p. 134) to an Alexandrian Jew writing some-
time between the second century B.C. and the middle of the first century A.D.

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wrote, Xenophanes declared that the soul was \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\u03b5\mu\alpha \). But lacking the full context of Xenophanes’ statement, or other evidence by which to interpret it exactly, we cannot tell precisely what he meant by \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\u03b5\mu\alpha \) as a predicate of \( \psi\varepsilon\chi\dot{\iota} \). The preceding statement, “everything that comes into being is perishable,” taken with the contemporary evidence as to the use of \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\u03b5\mu\alpha \), leads one to suspect that by \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\u03b5\mu\alpha \) he meant breath, or air, and that the statement should be understood to mean that Xenophanes, as against the views of his predecessors, who maintained that the \( \psi\varepsilon\chi\dot{\iota} \) lives after death as a shade, was the first to affirm that everything that comes into being is also subject to extinction, and that under this general law the soul also is but breath or air. If this is the meaning of the passage it is evident that \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\u03b5\mu\alpha \) does not here mean a (living) spirit or (living) soul-stuff, but belongs under 3 above (cf. Soph. Fr. 13 cited p. 17), and that, if the statement of Diogenes about Xenophanes is correct, it had not yet in the sixth century B.C. acquired the former meaning.\(^2\) Apparently, however, we find in Xenophanes the first definite traces of that association of \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\u03b5\mu\alpha \) and \( \psi\varepsilon\chi\dot{\iota} \) which was destined to play so large a part in the subsequent history of the two words.

To Anaximenes, a contemporary of Xenophanes, Plutarch ascribes the words:

\[
o\iota\omicron\iota \ \eta \ \psi\varepsilon\chi\dot{\iota}, \ \phi\eta\sigma\iota\nu, \ \eta \ \eta\mu\epsilon\tau\epsilon\alpha \ \alpha\acute{a}\rho \ \omicron\sigma\sigma\alpha \ \sigma\upsilon\gamma\kappa\rho\alpha\tau\epsilon\iota \ \epsilon\mu\acute{a}s, \ \kappa\alpha\iota \ \delta\omicron\omicron\omicron \ \tau\omicron\ \kappa\omicron\sigma\omicron\mu\omicron \ \pi\nu\varepsilon\u03b5\mu\alpha \ \kappa\alpha\iota \ \alpha\acute{a}\rho \ \pi\epsilon\riem\epsilon\chi\epsilon\iota.\]

As our souls, being air, control us, so wind(?) and air encompass the whole world.

\(^1\) Diog. Laert. ix. 2. 3: \( \pi\rho\omega\tau\omicron \ \tau\prime \ \alpha\acute{p}e\eta\nu\acute{n}\alpha\tau\omicron \ \delta\acute{t}i \ \pi\acute{a}n \ \tau\omicron \ \gamma\iota\nu\delta\omicron\mu\omicron\nu \ \phi\theta\alpha\tau\omicron\nu \ \lambda\omicron\omicron\omicron, \ \kappa\alpha\iota \ \eta \ \psi\varepsilon\chi\dot{\iota} \ \pi\nu\varepsilon\u03b5\mu\alpha.\)

\(^2\) Between this statement and that of Siebeck, Geschichte der Psychologie, II, 132, that air in motion (\( \pi\nu\varepsilon\u03b5\mu\alpha \)) was from very early times regarded by the Greeks as more than a blind mechanical power, and the breath as life-giving, there is no necessary conflict. The latter conception, so obviously suggested by experience, would naturally precede the conception of the \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\u03b5\mu\alpha \) as itself alive, either a spirit or spirit-substance possessing life (cf. the passage from Epicharmus); and between the two there might easily arise the thought, apparently expressed by Xenophanes, that the \( \psi\varepsilon\chi\dot{\iota} \) is \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\u03b5\mu\alpha \), breath or air, life-giving indeed, but not living, and hence the \( \psi\varepsilon\chi\dot{\iota} \) perishable, how he does not expressly say, but doubtless through the departure of the \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\u03b5\mu\alpha \) from the body and its return to the general mass of unconscious air.

\(^3\) Plac. Phil. i. 3. Of course \( \pi\nu\varepsilon\u03b5\mu\alpha \) was not the only term which the ancient Greeks used to describe the quality or nature of the \( \psi\varepsilon\chi\dot{\iota} \). Both before and after
While πνεῦμα is not here predicated of ἡ ψυχή, yet it is evident that πνεῦμα and ἄρρ are nearly synonymous terms, and the parallelism of the two clauses, together with the affirmation that the ψυχή is ἄρρ, throws some light upon the question what other writers mean when they say that the ψυχή is πνεῦμα.

Aristotle has certain usages which are apparently peculiar to him, and which demand attention in this connection. He uses the expression σύμφυτον πνεῦμα to denote air that belongs in, apparently is born in, the body as distinguished from that which is inhaled. He ascribes to it various functions in the body, such as smell, motion, hearing, and cooling. Thus in i. 659b, 17–19, speaking of animals that have no nostrils, he says:

τὰ δὲ ἑντομα διὰ τοῦ ὑποζώματος αἰσθάνονται τῶν ὑσμῶν, καὶ πάντα τῷ συμφύτῳ πνεῦματι τοῦ σώματος ὀσπερ κυνεῖαι τούτο δὲ ὑπάρχει φῶςει πᾶσι καὶ οὐ θύραθεν ἐκπεισακτὸν ἔστιν.

And the insects detect odors through the hypozone, and all (animals not having nostrils) possess the power of smell, as of motion, by virtue of the inborn air of the body; and this belongs to all by nature, and is not brought in from outside.

So also in i. 669a. 1, distinguishing animals that have lungs and those that have not, and the different ways in which they are "cooled," whether by water or air, he says:

τὰ δὲ μὴ ἑναιμα καὶ τῷ συμφύτῳ πνεῦματι δύναται καταψύχειν.

And the non-sanguineous animals by the inborn air are able to be cooled.

But in i. 743b. 37 ff., speaking of animals in general, he says:

ἀλλὰ τὸ μὲν τῆς ἄφθαρσις καὶ γενέσεως εὐθὺς ἐστιν σῶμα ἢ τοῦ σώματος τῷ τῶν κρύων, ἢ δὲ δοφρησίς καὶ ἡ ἀκοή πόρου συνάπτοντες πρὸς τὸν ἄερα τοῦ θύραθεν, πλήρεις συμφύτων πνεύματος.

But while the [sense-organ] of touch and taste is simply the body or some part of the body of animals, those of smell and hearing are passages connecting with the outer air and full of inborn air.

Xenophanes there was the view that the soul was fire, the two conceptions, however, not being sharply antagonistic, πῦρ being in some cases at least thought of as transmutable into πνεῦμα, and in others it being affirmed that the ψυχή was πνεῦμα βερμύν. The full discussion of this matter, fundamental for the history of psychology, would carry us too far afield from our lexicographical study. But see Siebeck, Geschichte der Psychologie, I, 43 ff.; Arnold, Roman Stoicism, p. 243.
Again in 741b. 37 ff., speaking of the development of offspring of animals, he says:

διορίζεται δὲ τὰ μέρη τῶν ζῴων πνεύματι, οὐ μέντοι οὕτε τῷ τῆς γεννάσθης οὕτε τῷ αὐτοῦ, καθάπερ τινὲς τῶν φυσικῶν φασίν.

And the parts of animals are differentiated by πνεῦμα, not however by either that of the mother or that of the offspring itself, as some physicists say. Then follows an argument from the case of animals produced from an egg, and from the fact that viviparous animals do not breathe until the lungs are produced. Jaeger⁴ argues that though σύμφυτον is omitted, it is the σύμφυτον πνεῦμα that is referred to, and that it is this which, according to Aristotle, differentiates animate beings from inanimate things. This is not impossible, but neither is vital power distinctly ascribed to σύμφυτον πνεῦμα, nor is it definitely attributed to plants, so far as the present study has discovered.

In the Περὶ Κόσμου, however, there occurs a passage in which πνεῦμα seems clearly to bear a vital sense:

1. 394b: ἐκ δὲ τῆς ξηρᾶς ὑπὸ ψύχους μὲν ὀσθέης ὡστε βείν ἄνεμος ἐγένετο· οὐδὲν γάρ ἐστιν οὕτως πλὴν ἀὴρ πολὺς βείν καὶ ἀθρόος· ὅστις ἁμα καὶ πνεῦμα λέγεται. Λέγεται δὲ καὶ ἐτέρως πνεῦμα ἡ τε ἐν φυτοῖς καὶ ζῴους καὶ διὰ πάντων διήκουσα ἐμψυχός τε καὶ γόνιμος οὐσία, περὶ ἢ Ἕν λέγειν οὐκ ἀναγκαῖον.

But from the dry (air?), when it is impinged upon by the cold so that it flows, wind arises. For this is nothing but a large amount of air, flowing and massed together; and it is also called πνεῦμα. But in another sense the word πνεῦμα is applied to the substance which is in both plants and animals and permeates all and is both living and generative—concerning which it is not necessary to speak at this time.

One might be disposed to think that Aristotle is here speaking of the σύμφυτον πνεῦμα to which he ascribes so important functions, but the σύμφυτον πνεῦμα is apparently limited to animals, while the πνεῦμα of which he is here speaking is in both plants and animals; if indeed it does not permeate all things. It seems clear therefore that he is here using πνεῦμα in the sense of a universal principle of life, if not even of existence.⁵

¹ "Das Pneuma in Lykeion," in Hermes, XXXVIII, 43 ff.
² Sextus Empiricus, writing in the third century A.D., ascribes to the followers of Pythagoras and Empedocles the doctrine that there is one spirit (πνεῦμα) which
From this evidence, though somewhat scanty and not altogether clear, it nevertheless appears that from the sixth century B.C. πνεῦμα was predicated of the soul, and that from the time of Sophocles at least the idea of life was associated with the term. In Epicharmus it seems to denote soul-substance, that of which all souls are composed, from which they are all taken, and to which they all return, and in Aristotle's time the notion appears to have been so expanded that πνεῦμα signified the basis of all life, whether of plants or animals.

It should be observed, however, that in none of the passages cited is the term individualized, so as to denote the soul of the individual, nor do the affirmations made concerning it involve the assertion of individual immortality. The conception of a soul-substance out of which souls are made does not indeed exclude personal immortality; but the affirmation that at death it returns to the ether or whence it came is not naturally associated with a belief in personal immortality. That Sophocles and Euripides should use the expression πνεῦμα ἀπορρῆχαι for death is not surprising, for here πνεῦμα means only breath [of life]. We are nearer to an assertion of the personal immortality of the πνεῦμα in the statement ascribed to Epicharmus (p. 19) that the pious man has nothing to fear because his spirit will abide in heaven; but in its original form the passage probably refers to reabsorption in the universal πνεῦμα. It is at any rate significant that Plato and Xenophon, who speak definitely of the immortality of the soul (see below under ψυχή), seem never to have used πνεῦμα as it is employed in these passages from Epicharmus and Sophocles, and that it is in permeates the whole world like a soul and unites us to the irrational animals (ἐν γὰρ ὑπάρχειν πνεῦμα τὸ διὰ πάντὸς τοῦ κόσμου δίκου ψυχῆς τρόπον τὸ καὶ ἐνὸν ἡμᾶς πρὸς ἑαυτᾶ. Diels, Vorsokrat., I, 275, B 136). If this view really belonged to Pythagoras and Empedocles themselves, it would be an anticipation even of the view which, according to Aristotle, was held in his time. But, in view of the uncertainty as to the persons referred to as the followers of Pythagoras and Empedocles, it is necessary to treat the passage along with other post-Christian testimony. Cf. pp. 130, 139 f.

1 Even in the Potidaea inscription quoted on p. 30, in which the individualizing ψυχή is used, it is affirmed, not that the ψυχή lives as such after death, but that the ether receives it. Cf. Gomperz, Greek Thinkers, II, 84: "What was called in question [by Epicharmus and Euripides] was the personal, not the conscious, survival of the soul; for the ether, or heavenly substance, was conceived as the vehicle of a world-soul identified with the supreme deity."
Aristotle, who distinctly rejects the idea of the immortality of the individual soul, that the usage reappears, though, to be sure, modified by Aristotle's notion of life as common to plants and animals. It is indeed not wholly clear, nor is it, for our present purpose, of any great significance whether in the obiter dictum quoted from Aristotle he meant for himself to affirm the existence of such a universal life-substance or only to say that the word was used by some of his contemporaries in this sense. What is of importance is that in the time of Aristotle πνεύμα had not yet come to mean a spirit, the immaterial element of an embodied being, or an unembodied person, but that it had for some two centuries been used to mean spirit in a non-individuated sense constituting or proceeding from a sort of reservoir of soul-substance or life-principle. From the quotation of Clement of Alexandria from Epicharmus we might infer that this soul-material present in an individual about to surrender it in death might be called τὸ πνεύμα, but the presence of the article is probably due to Clement rather than to Epicharmus, and in any case the individual human spirit conceived of as the seat and organ of psychic activities was apparently never so spoken of.¹

II. Ἡχή

Ἑχή is throughout the history of its use in extant Greek writers prevailingly a vital term, i.e., a word carrying with it the idea of life, and, until Aristotle (who applies the term to plants), life involving some measure of consciousness or possibility of consciousness. It is found, moreover, even in Homer, both in the more abstract sense of life-principle, the loss of which is death, and of soul as a conscious entity existing after death. It is evident, therefore, that in the earliest extant literature we are already at an advanced stage in the development of the usage of the word. We cannot, accordingly, reason as if the Homeric usages were the original sources from which all others were developed. Later usages may have their roots in usage antecedent to Homer or may have arisen from the

¹ Completeness of treatment would require a discussion of the usage of the Socratic schools. See Zeller, Socrates and the Socratic Schools; Mullach, Fragmenta Philosoporum Graecorum; Diogenes Laertius, Book ii and Book vi. Inasmuch, however, as these schools were largely absorbed either in Epicureanism or Stoicism, and such influence as they had upon later thought was exerted through these latter schools, in the interest of brevity completeness is sacrificed.